Sub­mit­ted by the Belaru­sian Asso­ci­a­tion of Jour­nal­ists (main sub­mit­ting orga­ni­za­tion) and Free Press Unlim­it­ed. Down­load PDF.

The Belaru­sian Asso­ci­a­tion of Jour­nal­ists (BAJ) is the largest non-gov­ern­men­tal, non-prof­it asso­ci­a­tion of Belaru­sian media rep­re­sen­ta­tives. Since 1995, BAJ has been pro­mot­ing free­dom of expres­sion and pro­tect­ing rights of media work­ers in Belarus. It sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly mon­i­tors vio­la­tions in this sphere, serv­ing as a unique source of infor­ma­tion on the coun­try’s media land­scape. Since 2021, BAJ has oper­at­ed in exile.

Jogai­los g. 4, LT-01116 Vil­nius, Lithua­nia

https://baj.media/en/

Con­tact: Aleh Aheyeu, deputy chair, office@baj.media

Free Press Unlim­it­ed (FPU) is an inter­na­tion­al press free­dom orga­ni­za­tion that col­lab­o­rates with over 300 local media part­ners in more than 50 coun­tries. With these part­ners, FPU works on its mis­sion to make inde­pen­dent news and infor­ma­tion avail­able to every­one.

Weesper­straat 3, 1018 DN Ams­ter­dam, Nether­lands

https://www.freepressunlimited.org/

Con­tact: Evelien Wijk­stra, head of pol­i­cy and advo­ca­cy, wijkstra@freepressunlimited.org

Introduction

1. This state­ment is sub­mit­ted joint­ly by the Belaru­sian Asso­ci­a­tion of Jour­nal­ists (BAJ) and Free Press Unlim­it­ed for the 4^th cycle of the Uni­ver­sal Peri­od­ic Review of Belarus.
2. Belarus has not accept­ed any UPR rec­om­men­da­tions with­out mod­i­fi­ca­tion, and has only accept­ed a num­ber of rec­om­men­da­tions relat­ed to press and media free­dom as ‘imple­ment­ed.’ As such, Belarus has con­sid­ered the rec­om­men­da­tions made to already have been ade­quate­ly imple­ment­ed in nation­al pol­i­cy and leg­is­la­tion at the time of accep­tance. How­ev­er, none of the accept­ed rec­om­men­da­tions were suc­cess­ful­ly imple­ment­ed. The state of free­dom of expres­sion and opin­ion in Belarus has tak­en a sig­nif­i­cant turn for the worse since the last UPR review, for which stake­hold­ers last had oppor­tu­ni­ty to sub­mit input to in April of 2020.
3. As of 2024, Belarus scores amongst the very bot­tom coun­tries on Report­ing with­out Bor­ders’ press free­dom index,^[i] posi­tioned 167th out of 180 coun­tries. Since the ruth­less sup­pres­sion of peace­ful protests fol­low­ing the con­tro­ver­sial re-elec­tion of Ali­ak­san­dr Lukashen­ka in 2020, extreme mea­sures have been put in place by the regime in order to curb dis­sent towards state pol­i­cy. Leg­isla­tive mea­sures have sys­tem­atized major con­stric­tions on media free­dom and have grave­ly impact­ed the safe­ty and via­bil­i­ty of jour­nal­ists. Although arti­cle 33 of the Belaruss­ian con­sti­tu­tion enshrines the free­dom of opin­ion and expres­sion, anti-extrem­ist laws have been wide­ly applied to curb any crit­i­cal voic­es, whether online or in mass media. In the after­math of the 2020 elec­tions, almost all non-state backed media out­lets have had their media sta­tus with­drawn, and have been raid­ed, searched, tar­get­ed by crim­i­nal pros­e­cu­tions, and banned.
4. Jour­nal­ists face sig­nif­i­cant threats includ­ing cen­sor­ship and the threat of vio­lence, arrest, and impris­on­ment. These threats are not con­tained with­in Belaruss­ian bor­ders; jour­nal­ists also face transna­tion­al repres­sion, are com­mon­ly sur­veilled, sen­tenced in absen­tia. The regime also tar­gets their fam­i­lies through intim­i­da­tion and search­ing. The over-des­ig­na­tion the ‘extrem­ist label’ being applied with­out ade­quate grounds on var­i­ous media out­lets, non-gov­ern­men­tal orga­ni­za­tions, and civ­il soci­ety groups has result­ed into close to a halt of all inde­pen­dent media and civ­il soci­ety actors in the coun­try. For indi­vid­u­als, being asso­ci­at­ed with any ‘extrem­ist activ­i­ty’ can result in an admin­is­tra­tive or crim­i­nal offence result­ing in impris­on­ment Belaruss­ian pris­ons, which are known to vio­late inter­na­tion­al human rights stan­dards in regard to ill treat­ment and tor­ture. Belarus has not­ed many rec­om­men­da­tions relat­ed to human rights of detainees and polit­i­cal pris­on­ers in the 3rd UPR cycle. It has accept­ed as imple­ment­ed a small num­ber of rec­om­men­da­tions relat­ed to treat­ing detainees in line with human rights law, to inves­ti­gate alle­ga­tions of tor­ture, and improve health care for pris­on­ers. How­ev­er, it has not tak­en any steps to alle­vi­ate these issues.^[ii]
5. The fol­low­ing analy­sis will be based on the year­ly mon­i­tor­ing reports of the Belaruss­ian Asso­ci­a­tion of Jour­nal­ists[iii] and the Spe­cial Rapporteur’s reports. In 2024, the report of the Spe­cial Rap­por­teur on the sit­u­a­tion of human rights described repres­sion of the free­dom of expres­sion as a “long-term, sys­temic issue” in Belarus. The UNSR has also not­ed declin­ing lev­els of engage­ment with inter­na­tion­al human rights bod­ies and mech­a­nisms since 2020. Belarus notes in its UPR report that it does not accept any coun­try-spe­cif­ic rec­om­men­da­tions made under the Unit­ed Nations Human Rights Coun­cil.

Journalists during assemblies

6. Mul­ti­ple state poli­cies and laws in Belarus seri­ous­ly encroach on the enjoy­ment of the free­dom of peace­ful assem­bly, with­out excep­tion for jour­nal­ists. This is best illus­trat­ed by the 2020 elec­tion protests. Reports doc­u­ment the vio­lent dis­per­sal of these demon­stra­tions, dur­ing which police tar­get­ed jour­nal­ists, con­fis­cat­ed their equip­ment and destroyed mate­ri­als. Jour­nal­ists were fre­quent­ly treat­ed like “par­tic­i­pants” rather than observers and faced admin­is­tra­tive arrests up to 15 days or heavy fines for vio­la­tions of The Law on Mass Events (Arti­cle 24.23 of the Code of Admin­is­tra­tive Offences, known as Arti­cle 23.34 before 2021).
7. The Crim­i­nal Code fur­ther­more jeop­ar­dizes any per­son engaged in protests and peace­ful assem­bly, pri­mar­i­ly through appli­ca­tion of Arti­cle 342 of the Crim­i­nal Code, which crim­i­nal­izes “orga­niz­ing or par­tic­i­pat­ing in group actions that gross­ly vio­late pub­lic order.” This pro­vi­sion is also used to bring charges against jour­nal­ists for cov­er­ing the demon­stra­tions and to impose long prison sen­tences on them. For instance, jour­nal­ists Kat­siary­na Bakhvala­va and Darya Chultso­va were detained for stream­ing a ral­ly for Bel­sat TV chan­nel in Novem­ber 2020. They were charged with ‘coor­di­nat­ing the actions of the pro­test­ers’ and lat­er sen­tenced to two years of impris­on­ment.^[iv]
8. Fol­low­ing the 2020 protests, new laws were enact­ed to increase penal­ties for par­tic­i­pat­ing in assem­blies. Arti­cle 369–3 of the Crim­i­nal Сode was amend­ed in 2021 to increase the max­i­mum pun­ish­ment for pub­lic calls for orga­niz­ing an ille­gal assem­bly, gath­er­ing, or mass event from 3 to 5 years impris­on­ment. The max­i­mum fines under the Code of Admin­is­tra­tive Offences were increased by 3–4 times. In 2021 there were also fur­ther amend­ments to the Law “On Mass Events in the Repub­lic of Belarus”, which includes a ban on real-time cov­er­age of mass events vio­lat­ing pub­lic order, includ­ing by jour­nal­ists.
9. We thus do not con­sid­er the fol­low­ing rec­om­men­da­tions to have been imple­ment­ed:

• (accept­ed as imple­ment­ed) 138.141 Pro­tect the free­doms of expres­sion, assem­bly and asso­ci­a­tion (Alba­nia);
• (accept­ed as imple­ment­ed) 138.142 Ful­fil its oblig­a­tions under inter­na­tion­al human rights law with regard to free­dom of peace­ful assem­bly and asso­ci­a­tion, and free­dom of opin­ion and expres­sion (Argenti­na);
• (accept­ed as imple­ment­ed) 138.143 Refrain from intim­i­da­tion, harass­ment, arbi­trary arrest of and the dis­pro­por­tion­ate use of force against peo­ple exer­cis­ing their right to free­dom of expres­sion and peace­ful assem­bly (Bel­gium);
• (accept­ed as implemented)138.144 Guar­an­tee full respect for free­dom of opin­ion and expres­sion, includ­ing online, and for free­dom of assem­bly and asso­ci­a­tion, and har­mo­nize nation­al leg­is­la­tion in line with inter­na­tion­al stan­dards in this area (Ecuador);
• (accept­ed as implemented)138.151 Ful­fil its oblig­a­tions under the inter­na­tion­al human rights treaties regard­ing free­dom of expres­sion, free­dom of the media, free and fair elec­tions, peace­ful assem­bly, and pro­tec­tion against reprisals, ill-treat­ment or tor­ture (Roma­nia);
• (accept­ed as implemented)138.160 Ensure the safe­ty of all jour­nal­ists and the free­dom of peace­ful assem­bly in line with inter­na­tion­al stan­dards (Esto­nia);
• (accept­ed as cur­rent­ly being implemented)138.162 Abide by the oblig­a­tion under inter­na­tion­al law to respect the rights of jour­nal­ists, human rights defend­ers and oth­er indi­vid­u­als to exer­cise their free­dom of expres­sion, peace­ful assem­bly and asso­ci­a­tion (Fin­land);
• (par­tial­ly accept­ed in respect of respect for the right of peace­ful assem­bly) 138.176 Respect the right of peace­ful assem­bly, and release all indi­vid­u­als arbi­trar­i­ly detained for par­tic­i­pa­tion in peace­ful protests (Cana­da).

Facilitating a conducive environment for journalism

Anti-extremism laws

• Belarus’ anti-extrem­ist laws are far reach­ing and instru­men­tal­ized to intim­i­date and incar­cer­ate jour­nal­ists, and to dis­solve and stop oper­a­tions of inde­pen­dent media orga­ni­za­tions and pub­li­ca­tions. Inde­pen­dent jour­nal­ism as a whole is seen as an extrem­ist activ­i­ty, accord­ing to a 2023 UNHCHR report.^[v]
• The author­i­ties main­tain a list of indi­vid­u­als and orga­ni­za­tions involved in ‘ter­ror­ist’ or ‘extrem­ist’ activ­i­ties, includ­ing dozens of jour­nal­ists and media out­lets. As of April 7, 2025, 38 media out­lets have been labelled as an ‘extrem­ist orga­ni­za­tion’ or ‘extrem­ist for­ma­tion’. These include all the major inde­pen­dent media plat­forms, such as TUT.BY, the most pop­u­lar news web­site in the coun­try, as well as some Belaru­sian edi­to­r­i­al offices of for­eign media (Bel­sat TV chan­nel, Deutsche Welle Belarus).The ‘extrem­ist’ label is usu­al­ly imposed by law-enforce­ment agen­cies – the KGB and the Min­istry of Inter­nal Affairs – with­out any judi­cial over­sight.
• The Belaru­sian Asso­ci­a­tion of Jour­nal­ists is also des­ig­nat­ed as an ‘extrem­ist for­ma­tion’. In 2021, its office and the homes of sev­er­al staff mem­bers were sub­ject­ed to two rounds of search­es. BAJ was denied access to its head­quar­ters, its web­site was blocked, and its assets were frozen. In August 2021, the orga­ni­za­tion was forcibly liq­ui­dat­ed by a deci­sion of the Supreme Court. Lat­er, in 2023, the author­i­ties for­mal­ly labelled BAJ as an ‘extrem­ist for­ma­tion’. This is a com­mon course of events for sim­i­lar orga­ni­za­tions.
• Any­one involved with such ‘extrem­ist for­ma­tion’, or who have col­lab­o­rat­ed with it or financed it in any way, can be jailed for par­tic­i­pat­ing in extrem­ist for­ma­tion or facil­i­ta­tion of extrem­ist activ­i­ties. This has been applied wide­ly to employ­ees and con­trib­u­tors of inde­pen­dent media out­lets. For instance, video­g­ra­ph­er Yauhen Hlushk­ou and pho­tog­ra­ph­er Ales Sabaleus­ki were impris­oned, alleged­ly for coop­er­at­ing with the YouTube chan­nel 6TV Belarus and the web­site Mahilou.Media, both of which were des­ig­nat­ed as ‘extrem­ist for­ma­tions’ by the KGB.^[vi] Sim­i­lar­ly, Darya Losik was sen­tenced to two years in prison for giv­ing an inter­view to Bel­sat TV about the con­di­tions of her impris­oned hus­band.^[vii]
• Since 2020, exist­ing laws have been increas­ing­ly applied to encom­pass almost any media-relat­ed activ­i­ty under the ‘extrem­ist’ label. The list of activ­i­ties that can be rec­og­nized as ‘extrem­ist’ was fur­ther­more broad­ened through leg­isla­tive amend­ments in 2021. For exam­ple, insult­ing a pub­lic offi­cial is now con­sid­ered as an extrem­ist act under Belaruss­ian law. The broad and far-reach­ing laws and their wide­spread enforce­ment result­ed in a three­fold increase of court deci­sions on ‘extrem­ism’ with­in the year of 2021. In prac­tice, the real rea­sons behind such pros­e­cu­tions are often expres­sions crit­i­cal of the gov­ern­ment, con­dem­na­tions of Russia’s aggres­sion against Ukraine, or even his­tor­i­cal pub­li­ca­tions that con­tra­dict the offi­cial nar­ra­tive.
• Extrem­ism laws are not lim­it­ed to crim­i­nal charges — they also encom­pass admin­is­tra­tive offences. ‘Dis­trib­ut­ing extrem­ist mate­ri­als’ can result in fines or admin­is­tra­tive arrest up to 15 days under the Arti­cle 19.11 of the Code of Admin­is­tra­tive Offences. As of Feb­ru­ary, 2025, the list of extrem­ist mate­ri­als by the Min­istry of Infor­ma­tion includ­ed almost 7 thou­sand posi­tions, includ­ing media web-sites, Telegram and Youtube chan­nels and so on.^[viii] Through­out the eval­u­at­ed peri­od, it has become com­mon for cit­i­zens to be pros­e­cut­ed for dis­trib­ut­ing ‘extrem­ist’ media pro­duc­tion for repost­ing pub­li­ca­tions, even if repost­ed before being des­ig­nat­ed as ‘extrem­ist’, or even for sub­scrib­ing to ‘extrem­ist’ social media chan­nels. In 2024 alone, between 2,600 and 5,500 con­vic­tions were made for dis­sem­i­nat­ing extrem­ist mate­ri­als.^[ix]
• We thus do not con­sid­er the fol­low­ing rec­om­men­da­tions to have been imple­ment­ed: 141 (see p.3), 138.142 (see p.3), 138.143 (see p.3), 138.44 (see p.3), 138.151 (see p.3–4), 138.160 (see p.4), 138.162 (see p.4), 138.176 (see p.4)

Detention and Criminal Prosecution

• Polit­i­cal impris­on­ment is one of the most impact­ful issues affect­ing the enjoy­ment of human rights in Belarus, includ­ing the right to free­dom of expres­sion. The UNSP describes arbi­trary deten­tion as a ‘chron­ic issue’, exac­er­bat­ed by the 2020 protests.^[x]
• Accord­ing to the Reporters with­out Bor­ders, in the reviewed peri­od (2021–2024), Belarus has con­sis­tent­ly scored with­in the 5 ‘largest pris­ons for jour­nal­ists’ in the world – coun­tries that detain the most jour­nal­ists.^[xi] Since 2021, there have been more than 230 cas­es of jour­nal­ists being detained, dozens were giv­en long prison sen­tences for their work. For exam­ple, in 2023, TUT.BY media-work­ers – edi­tor-in-chief Mary­na Zolata­va and CEO Lud­mi­la Chek­ina – were giv­en jail terms of 12 years.^[xii] As of April 7, 2025, not less than 40 jour­nal­ists remain impris­oned, with the longest sen­tence reach­ing 15 years.
• Con­di­tions in Belaruss­ian pris­ons are noto­ri­ous for vio­lat­ing human rights stan­dards of ill treat­ment and tor­ture. Sen­tences are harsh and exten­sive, with reports doc­u­ment­ing sys­tem­at­ic tor­ture, beat­ings, denial of med­ical care, soli­tary con­fine­ment and incom­mu­ni­ca­do deten­tion. There is a wide­spread prac­tice, espe­cial­ly with regard to civ­il soci­ety activists, includ­ing jour­nal­ists, of arbi­trary depri­va­tion of phone calls and cor­re­spon­dence, repeat­ed place­ment in puni­tive cells, and trans­fer to cell-type premis­es for up to six months. This can be illus­trat­ed by the cas­es of jour­nal­ists Dzia­n­is Ivashyn^[xiii] and Andrzej Poc­zobut^[xiv] who both were sub­ject­ed to all kinds of such treat­ment. Fur­ther­more, arti­cle 411 of the Crim­i­nal Code is com­mon­ly used to arbi­trar­i­ly increase the prison sen­tence for dis­obey­ing the demands of prison admin­is­tra­tion, like in case of jour­nal­ist Ihar Karnei, who had ten months added to his sen­tence.^[xv]
• The impact of con­di­tions in pris­ons, seen in the con­text of wide­spread arbi­trary arrests, can­not be over­stat­ed. For exam­ple, in 2023, Ihar Losik, a for­mer employ­ee of Radio Free Europe / Radio Lib­er­ty, had been on hunger strike and had cut his hands and neck while detained, and has been pro­hib­it­ed from meet­ing lawyers, rel­a­tives, and receiv­ing cor­re­spon­dence since.^[xvi] Blog­ger Mikalay Klimovich sen­tenced on charges of insult­ing the Pres­i­dent for shar­ing car­i­ca­ture of Ali­ak­san­dr Lukashen­ka on social media died in prison that same year due to a seri­ous heart con­di­tion that was known to the court at the time of sen­tenc­ing.^[xvii]
• We thus do not con­sid­er the fol­low­ing rec­om­men­da­tions to have been imple­ment­ed: 141 (see p.3), 138.142 (see p.3), 138.143 (see p.3), 138.44 (see p.3), 138.151 (see p.3–4), 138.160 (see p.4), 138.162 (see p.4), 138.176 (see p.4).

Safety of journalists, intimidation, and harassment

• Jour­nal­ists are sub­ject­ed to vio­lence while per­form­ing their pro­fes­sion­al duties, as well as dur­ing arrest and deten­tion. Dur­ing 2020, 62 such cas­es were record­ed.
• Under expan­sive repres­sive poli­cies, author­i­ties are known to search and seize the prop­er­ty of jour­nal­ists and media out­lets. Search­es are fre­quent­ly accom­pa­nied by deten­tions, but can also occur inde­pen­dent­ly. Since 2021, there have been more than 300 search­es of jour­nal­ists’ prop­er­ty and media offices, often accom­pa­nied by the con­fis­ca­tion of tech­ni­cal equip­ment.
• Jour­nal­ists in exile face sig­nif­i­cant threats. As men­tioned pri­or, jour­nal­ists in exile can be sen­tenced in absen­tia. Crim­i­nal pros­e­cu­tion of jour­nal­ists both inside and out­side Belarus is on the rise as of 2024. Rel­a­tives of exiled media work­ers have been sub­ject­ed to harass­ment and pres­sure, through search­es, for exam­ple. The Belaru­sian author­i­ties also use Inter­pol in attempts to track down and extra­dite jour­nal­ists, some­times also using charges of eco­nom­ic crimes – as in the case of Andrei Hniot, who was detained in Ser­bia and spent a year in cus­tody and under house arrest.^[xvi­ii]
• Cas­es of vio­lence against jour­nal­ists are fur­ther­more not inves­ti­gat­ed, nor are claims of vio­lence in jails. There are no pro­tec­tions against state-reprisals or recourse through the judi­cia­ry.
• We thus do not con­sid­er the fol­low­ing rec­om­men­da­tions to have been imple­ment­ed: 141 (see p.3), 138.142 (see p.3), 138.143 (see p.3), 138.44 (see p.3), 138.151 (see p.3–4), 138.160 (see p.4), 138.162 (see p.4), 138.176 (see p.4).

Access to the Internet, interference, and censorship

• Accord­ing to Free­dom house, inter­net free­dom in Belarus has decreased year­ly in the peri­od under review from 38/100 points in 2020[xix] to 22/100 in 2024.^[xx] This demon­strates that although inter­net free­dom was restrict­ed before 2020, opaque and arbi­trary restric­tions have reached new heights since. Belaru­sian author­i­ties severe­ly restrict inter­net access by block­ing vir­tu­al­ly all inde­pen­dent media web­sites, as well as some for­eign news orga­ni­za­tions that cov­er Belarus. The Law “On Mass Media” per­mits the gov­ern­ment to block web­sites in case of threats to nation­al secu­ri­ty or any extrem­ist activ­i­ty with­out court deci­sion. By the amend­ments of 2021 the grounds for web­site block­ing have been expand­ed, grant­i­ng this author­i­ty not only to the Min­istry of Infor­ma­tion but also to pros­e­cu­tors. Since April 2024, the Oper­a­tional and Ana­lyt­i­cal Cen­ter under the Pres­i­dent has begun revok­ing the domain names of inde­pen­dent media using the nation­al .by domain exten­sion, if they are includ­ed in the list of extrem­ist mate­ri­als.^[xxi]
• The author­i­ties respond­ed to the 2020 protests by shut­ting down inter­net access, and Ali­ak­san­dr Lukashen­ka has threat­ened anoth­er shut­down if there are protests dur­ing the upcom­ing 2025 elec­tions. In 2021, the Oper­a­tional and Ana­lyt­i­cal Cen­ter under the Pres­i­dent has been grant­ed the author­i­ty to cut off inter­net access with­out judi­cial over­sight.
• In 2021 and 2023, amend­ments were made to the Law “On Mass Media”, intro­duc­ing restric­tions to the estab­lish­ment and reg­is­tra­tion of Belaru­sian and for­eign mass media. The Min­istry of Infor­ma­tion can can­cel accred­i­ta­tions of jour­nal­ists, includ­ing for for­eign cor­re­spon­dents, and ban dis­tri­b­u­tion of media. The Law “On Mass Media” pro­vides the legal basis for block­ing for­eign and local news web­sites and pow­ers to can­cel a media outlet’s reg­is­tra­tion if its founder is involved in ‘extrem­ist’ activ­i­ties.^[xxii] Restric­tions fur­ther­more include a ban on found­ing a media out­let for a peri­od of 3 to 5 years for indi­vid­u­als who were mem­bers of an ‘extrem­ist’ orga­ni­za­tion or owned a blocked web resource. As such, the Min­istry is broad­ly sanc­tioned to inter­fere with and cen­sor infor­ma­tion and mes­sages to be dis­trib­uted to the pub­lic.
• Crim­i­nal lia­bil­i­ty for defama­tion-relat­ed offences remains in force, includ­ing for: insult of the Pres­i­dent of the Repub­lic of Belarus (Arti­cle 368), insult of a pub­lic offi­cial (Arti­cle 369), insult of a judge (Arti­cle 391), insult of a sub­or­di­nate by a supe­ri­or or of a supe­ri­or by a sub­or­di­nate (Arti­cle 444), slan­der (Arti­cle 188), slan­der against the Pres­i­dent (Arti­cle 367), and dis­cred­it­ing the Repub­lic of Belarus (Arti­cle 369–1). Some lim­it­ed improve­ments in leg­is­la­tion took place dur­ing this peri­od: in 2021, gen­er­al insult (with­out a spe­cif­ic tar­get) was decrim­i­nal­ized, while lia­bil­i­ty for insult­ing the pres­i­dent and cer­tain offi­cials was retained. How­ev­er, the over­all sit­u­a­tion has not changed sig­nif­i­cant­ly – defama­tion-relat­ed offences con­tin­ue to be used as tools of cen­sor­ship and per­se­cu­tion of jour­nal­ists for voic­ing crit­i­cism of the author­i­ties.
• While sup­press­ing alter­na­tive view­points, the state active­ly pro­motes its own media in an effort to con­trol nation­al dis­course. Due to the absence of inde­pen­dent media, cit­i­zens become increas­ing­ly reliant on state-run out­lets, which serve the nar­ra­tives of the gov­ern­ment, spread pro­pa­gan­da and dis­in­for­ma­tion and pro­mote hate speech against polit­i­cal oppo­nents.
• We thus do not con­sid­er the fol­low­ing rec­om­men­da­tions to have been imple­ment­ed: 141 (see p.3), 138.142 (see p.3), 138.143 (see p.3), 138.44 (see p.3), 138.151 (see p.3–4), 138.160 (see p.4), 138.162 (see p.4), 138.176 (see p.4) as well as:
• (accept­ed as implemented)138.144 Guar­an­tee full respect for free­dom of opin­ion and expres­sion, includ­ing online, and for free­dom of assem­bly and asso­ci­a­tion, and har­mo­nize nation­al leg­is­la­tion in line with inter­na­tion­al stan­dards in this area (Ecuador);
• (accept­ed as imple­ment­ed) 138.172 Take the nec­es­sary action to ensure free­dom of expres­sion, and in par­tic­u­lar to ensure media inde­pen­dence and unfet­tered access to the Inter­net (Nor­way);
• (accept­ed as imple­ment­ed) 138.175 Guar­an­tee free­dom of expres­sion and media free­dom by ensur­ing the safe­ty of jour­nal­ists and oth­er media work­ers and refrain­ing from inter­fer­ence and cen­sor­ship (Swe­den);

Conclusion

• Belarus has failed to imple­ment the UPR rec­om­men­da­tions it accept­ed in 2021 relat­ed to press and media free­dom, the right to free­dom of expres­sion, peace­ful assem­bly, and the pro­tec­tion of jour­nal­ists. The sit­u­a­tion has sig­nif­i­cant­ly dete­ri­o­rat­ed since the last UPR review, with leg­isla­tive and pol­i­cy mea­sures sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly restrict­ing inde­pen­dent jour­nal­ism and curb­ing dis­sent. The wide­spread appli­ca­tion of anti-extrem­ist laws, transna­tion­al repres­sion of exiled jour­nal­ists, and tar­get­ed per­se­cu­tion of media work­ers and their fam­i­lies illus­trate an alarm­ing dis­re­gard for fun­da­men­tal human rights.
• The con­tin­ued impris­on­ment, intim­i­da­tion, and harass­ment of jour­nal­ists, along­side the sup­pres­sion of inde­pen­dent media out­lets, have effec­tive­ly elim­i­nat­ed free and inde­pen­dent report­ing with­in Belarus. Fur­ther­more, restric­tions on inter­net access, cen­sor­ship, and the monop­o­liza­tion of infor­ma­tion by state-con­trolled media have exac­er­bat­ed the ero­sion of press free­dom and free expres­sion in the coun­try.
• The government’s refusal to engage with inter­na­tion­al human rights mech­a­nisms, includ­ing its rejec­tion or mis­rep­re­sen­ta­tion of UPR rec­om­men­da­tions, fur­ther under­scores its lack of com­mit­ment to uphold­ing inter­na­tion­al human rights stan­dards. Despite accept­ing cer­tain rec­om­men­da­tions as ‘imple­ment­ed,’ Belarus has tak­en no tan­gi­ble steps to address the vio­la­tions out­lined in this report. Instead, it has inten­si­fied its crack­down on inde­pen­dent voic­es, using legal and extra­ju­di­cial mea­sures to silence crit­ics.

Recommendations

• The Belaru­sian Asso­ci­a­tion of Jour­nal­ists and Free Press Unlim­it­ed urge mem­ber states to address the fol­low­ing rec­om­men­da­tions to Belarus:

1. Release all jour­nal­ists and media work­ers held for work­ing in the media sec­tor and exer­cis­ing their right to free­dom of expres­sion.
2. Facil­i­tate a plu­ri­form and inde­pen­dent media envi­ron­ment by ceas­ing intim­i­da­tion and harass­ment of jour­nal­ists both nation­al­ly and transna­tion­al­ly by ceas­ing search­es, con­fis­ca­tion of prop­er­ty, and arbi­trary deten­tions.
3. Lift the ‘extrem­ist’ label placed on inde­pen­dent media orga­ni­za­tions and NGO’s.
4. Cease the over-appli­ca­tion of the extrem­ist label to silence crit­i­cal voic­es and ensure trans­paren­cy in the des­ig­na­tion process, and guar­an­tee that such des­ig­na­tions com­ply with the prin­ci­ples of due process, includ­ing the estab­lish­ment of an appeals process to chal­lenge deci­sions relat­ed to these labels.
5. Reform the legal sys­tem to align with inter­na­tion­al stan­dards on press free­dom, free­dom of assem­bly, as well as the right to be free from tor­ture and ill-treat­ment. This should include, among oth­er things, abol­ish­ing the Min­istry of Information’s author­i­ty to shut down media out­lets, repeal­ing the accred­i­ta­tion require­ment for jour­nal­ists and lift­ing bans on real-time cov­er­age of mass events.
6. Lift restric­tions on inter­net access and dig­i­tal cen­sor­ship, includ­ing the abo­li­tion of extra­ju­di­cial web­site block­ing, inter­net shut­downs, and the forced seizure of domain names by deci­sion of the Oper­a­tional and Ana­lyt­i­cal Cen­ter under the Pres­i­dent.
7. Amend the Crim­i­nal Code in regard to the fol­low­ing:
   • Decrim­i­nal­iz­ing defama­tion (Arti­cles 188, 367, 368, 369, 369–1, 391, 444);
   • Decrim­i­nal­iz­ing par­tic­i­pa­tion in peace­ful mass events (Arti­cle 342);
   • Amend Arti­cle 411 to ensure prison sen­tences can­not be arbi­trar­i­ly increased.
8. Amend the Code of Admin­is­tra­tive Offences to ensure that fines and admin­is­tra­tive arrests can­not be placed on those exer­cis­ing their right to free­dom of expres­sion and assem­bly.
9. Inves­ti­gate and pros­e­cute all instances of vio­lence and harass­ment, includ­ing those occur­ring in deten­tion facil­i­ties and jour­nal­ists in exile.
10. Re-engage with the Unit­ed Nations human rights sys­tem, tak­ing steps to end arbi­trary deten­tion and guar­an­tee the rights to free­dom of expres­sion, peace­ful assem­bly, and asso­ci­a­tion, while ensur­ing account­abil­i­ty for grave human rights vio­la­tions.
11. Allow human rights orga­ni­za­tions and watch­dogs to mon­i­tor press free­dom in Belarus.

^[i] https://rsf.org/en/index?year=2024

^[ii] https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/201, p. 17.

[iii] https://baj.media/en/aglyady-manitoringi/monitoring-report-2021/; https://baj.media/en/aglyady-manitoringi/mass-media-in-belarus-in-2022/; https://baj.media/en/aglyady-manitoringi/mass-media-in-belarus-in-2023/  

^[iv] https://spring96.org/en/news/102006

^[v] https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5268-belarus-run-2020-presidential-election-and-its-aftermath-report

^[vi] https://baj.media/en/freelance-videographer-yauhen-hlushkou-custody-over-participating-extremist-formation/

^[vii] https://prisoners.spring96.org/en/person/darja-losik

^[viii] https://humanconstanta.org/en/results-of-the-fight-against-extremism-in-belarus-in-2024/

^[ix] https://humanconstanta.org/en/results-of-the-fight-against-extremism-in-belarus-in-2024/#Extremism_in_numbers

^[x] https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/201, p.53.

^[xi] https://rsf.org/sites/default/files/medias/file/2024/12/RSF%20Round-up%202024%20EN.pdf

^[xii] https://baj.media/en/two-tutby-media-workers-sentenced-12-years-prison-three-more-wanted/

^[xiii] https://baj.media/en/belarusian-journalist-dzianis-ivashyn-denied-phone-calls-for-four-months/

^[xiv] https://prisoners.spring96.org/en/person/andrei-paczobut

^[xv] https://baj.media/en/journalist-ihar-karnei-sentenced-to-eight-more-months-in-prison/

^[xvi] https://baj.media/en/journalist-ihar-losik-attempts-suicide-jail/

^[xvii] https://spring96.org/en/news/111635

^[xvi­ii] https://baj.media/en/andrei-hniot-holds-press-conference-upon-departure-from-serbia/

[xix] https://freedomhouse.org/country/belarus/freedom-net/2020

^[xx] https://freedomhouse.org/country/belarus/freedom-net/2024

^[xxi] https://baj.media/en/the-decision-of-the-executive-analytical-center-was-a-setback-but-not-a-tragedy-media-managers-and-experts-comment-on-the-new-order-allowing-to-seize-domain-names/

^[xxii] https://cpj.org/2023/07/new-belarusian-media-law-allows-for-bans-on-foreign-media/